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ON TOTALLY BOUNDED GAMES 
RYSZARD KRETKOWSKI—RASTISLAV TELGARSKY 
The aim of this paper is to establish a closer connection between totally bounded 
games and compact-continuous ones (cf. the definitions below). It is known that 
each compact-continuous game is totally bounded. Here we show that each 
zero-sum two-person game of strategy with bounded payoff function is a dense 
subgame of a complete game, and thus, in particular, each totally bounded game is 
a dense subgame of a compact-continuous game. 
For the background in game theory the reader is refered to [7], and in topology 
to [1] or [3]. 
Let (X, y, P) be a game of strategy ([7], p. 114), i.e., X and y are the sets of 
strategies of Player I and Player II, respectively, and P: X x Y—>R is the real—I 
valued payoff function. Player I and Player II independently choose x in X and y in 
y, respectively. If P(x, y) = 0, then Player I receives from Player II the amount 
P(x, y); if P(x, y)<0, then Player II receives from Player I the amount \P(x, y)\. 
Player I (Player II) tries to maximize (minimize, resp.) the value of P(x, y). The 
game (X, y, P) is said to be determined if 
sup infP(jc, y) = inf sup P(x, y). 
x y y x 
In the sequel we assume that the payoff function P is bounded. 
The natural (intrinsic) pseudometric px for X and pY for y is defined by the 
formula 
Px(xu *2) = sup \P(xu y)-P(x2, y)\ 
y 
and 
Pr(yu y2) = sup \P(x, yi)-P(x, y2)\ 
X 
respectively [2, 7, 9,10]. Let us notice that one can convert the pseudometrics into 
metrics by identifying points which are not distinguished by the corresponding 
pseudometrics; the conversion has no influence on strategic properties of the game. 
It is easy to check that 
\P(xu yi)-P(x2, y2)\^px(xi, x2) + pY(yu y2). 
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Hence it follows that P is uniformly continuous with respect to the product 
pseudometric px><Y defined by the formula 
PXXY((*,, yO, (x2, y2)) = px(xu x2) + pY(yu y2). 
A game (A, B, Q) is said to be a subgame of a game (X, Y, P) if A a X, B <= Y 
and Q = P | ( A x B ) . 
From the definition of the natural pseudometrics it follows immediately that for 
any subgame (A, B, Q) of (X, y , P) we have 
pA^px\(AxA) and pB^pY\(B xB). 
A game (A, B, Q) is said to be a dense subgame of a game (X, y , P) if A and B 
are dense subsets of the pseudometric spaces (X, px) and ( y , pY) respectively, and 
Q = P | ( A x B ) . 
Let us notice that for any dense subgame (A, B, Q) of (X, y , P) we have 
p A = P x | ( A x A ) and PB=PY\(BXB). 
Furthermore, one can easily prove that 
sup inf Q(a, b) = sup inf P(JC, y) 
a b x y 
and 
inf supQ(a, b) = inf sup P(JC, y). 
b a y x 
We say that a game (X, y , P) is complete if the pseudometric spaces (X, px) 
and ( y , pY) are complete (cf. [3], Chapter 6). 
Theorem 1. Each game (X, Y, P) is a dense subgame of a complete game 
(X, y , P), i.e., each game has a completion. 
Proof. Let (X, px) and (Y,pY) be the completions of (X, px) and (Y,pY) 
respectively. Then setting 
PXXY((XI, yO, (x2, y2)) = px(xu x2) + pY(yu y2) 
we get a complete pseudometric for X x y so that 
P X X Y | ( X X y x x x y ) = pXxY 
and X x y is dense in (X x Y, px*Y). Since P is uniformly continuous with respect 
to pXxY, there is a function P: X x Y-+R such that P | ( X x y ) = P and P is 
uniformly continuous with respect to pXxY- Since (X, Y, P) is a subgame of 
(X, y , P), it suffices to prove that p x = Px and PY = PY. We shall show that p x = Px 
only, because the other equality can be shown similarly. So, let JC, z e X. To prove 
thatpx(jc, f )^p x ( jc , z), let us take any e>0 and Cauchy sequences (JCI, JC2, ...) and 
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(zi, z2, . . ) in (X, px) so that px(x, Jt„)->0 and px(z, z„)-»0 as n—•«. Then we 
have 
px(x, z') = sup \P(x, y)-P(z, y)| =sup |P(i, y)-P(z, y)|, 
because y is dense in (y, Pv) and \P(x, ) — P(z, )| is continuous on (y, pY). 
Hence 
Px(x,z)<\P(x,y)-P(z,y)\ + e 
for some y e Y. However, 
| P ( j t , y ) - P ( z , y ) | ^ 
^ | P ( i , y ) - P ( x „ , y ) | + |P(jt„ ,y)-P(z„,y) | + | P ( z „ , y ) - P ( z , y ) | , 
where |P(JC, y)-P(jt„, y) | ->0 and |P(z„, y)-P(z, y ) | ->0 as n->oo, because 
P(-9y) is continuous on (X, px). Hence there is an m e N such that for each n ̂  m 
we have 
px(x, z)<|P(x„, y)-P(zn, y)\ + 3e^px(xn, z„) + 3e. 
However, 
Px(Xn, Zn) = Px(Xn, Zn)^Px(Xn, x) + pX(x, Z) + pX(Z, Z„) 
and 
px(xk, x)<e and px(zk, z)<e 
for some k^m. Therefore 
Px(x, z)<px(x, z) + 5e. 
Finally, we prove the inequality px(jt, z)^px(x, z). Clearly 
PX(X, Z)^PX(X, Xn) + px(Xn, Zn) + Px(Zn, z) 
and hence 
Px(x,z)<px(xn,Zn) + 2e 
for some neN. However 
Px(Xn, Zn)=Px(Xn, Zn)^pX(Xn, Zn)^Px(Xn, X) + 
+ px(x, z) + px(z, Zn)^px(xn, x) + px(x, z) + px(z, Zn)<Px(x, z) + 2e 
and hence 
px(x, z)<px(x, z) + 4s. 
The proof is complete. 
Remark 1. The families {P(,y): yeY} and {P(JC, •): j t eX} of functions 
induce the natural uniformities <%x and °UY on X and y respectively. Then 
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obviously P is separately uniformly continuous on the product of the uniformities 
(X, °Ux) and ( y , °UY)- The following result, analogous to Theorem 1, was obtained 
by N. J. Y o u n g ([11], Theorem 7): P admits a separately uniformly continuous 
extension P onto the product of completions (X, Wx) and (Y, &Y) iff P satisfies 
the repeated limit condition, i.e., 
lim lim P(xm, yn) = lim lim P(xm, yn) 
m n n m 
provided that both iterated limits exist. 
We say that a game (X, Y, P) is totally bounded if the pseudometric spaces 
(X, px) and (Y, pY) are totally bounded (cf. [1], p. 332). 
Let us notice that a game (X, Y, P) is totally bounded iff at least one of the 
spaces (X, px) and ( Y, pY) is totally bounded (A. Wald [10], 2.1.3). Furthermore, 
each subgame of a totally bounded game is also totally bounded, because each 
subspace of a totally bounded pseudometric space is totally bounded. 
Totally bounded games constitute a natural generalization of matrix games 
because for each e > 0 there is a finite subgame which is e-close to the given game 
(cf. [10], Theorem 2.3). 
A game (X, Y, P) is said to be compact-continuous (J. E. Fens tad [2]) if X and 
Y are compact and P is continuous on X x Y. 
Since the completion of a totally bounded pseudometric space is totally bounded, 
and each totally bounded complete pseudometric space is compact, by Theorem 1 
we get 
Corollary. Each totally bounded game (X, Y, P) is a dense subgame of the 
compact-continuous game (X, Y, P). 
R e m a r k 2. It is well known that the mixed extension of a compact-continuous 
game constituted by countably additive probability Borel measures is again 
a compact-continuous game, where both players have optimal strategies. On the 
other hand, there are several types of mixed extensions of totally bounded games 
that are determined (cf. J. K ind le r [4,5]), and moreover, the players have 
optimal mixed strategies which are finitely additive probability Borel measures 
(J. E. Fens tad [2]). However, countably additive optimal mixed strategies need 
not exist in general (cf. [2]). Now, according to Corollary, if (X, Y, P) is totally 
bounded, then the players have optimal strategies which are countably additive 
probability measures defined on Borel a-fields of the completions X and Y. (Note 
that the values of the mixed extensions of (X, Y, P) and (X, Y, P) coincide.) 
It is easy to show that each compact-continuous game is totally bounded and 
complete. Hence, by Corollary, we get 
Theorem 2. A game (X, Y, P) is totally bounded iff it is a (dense) subgame of 
a compact-continuous game. 
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Remark 3 . Theorem 2 reaches beyond the scope of the game theory. E.g., its 
topological version reads as follows: a function P: X x Y—>R9 where X and y are 
sets, can be extended to a continuous function Pi: Xi x Yi—>R, where Xx and yi 
are compact spaces, iff P is bounded and the pseudometric space (X, px) is totally 
bounded. In view of that interpretation, Theorem 2 is analogous to the following 
result of V. Ptak [8]: a function P: X x y—>R, where X and Y are sets, can be 
extended to a separately continuous function P2: X 2 x y2—>R, where X2 and y 2 
are compact spaces, iff P is separately bounded and satisfies the repeated limit 
condition (cf. Remark 1 above). 
Remark 4. Denote by (X*, Y*, P*) the mixed extension of (X, Y, P) consist-
ing of finite mixtures of pure strategies (i.e., X* is the set of all jc*e[0, l ] x such 
that JC*(JC) = 0 for all but finitely many x e X, x*(x)i_0 for all x e X, ^x*(x) = 1, 
X 
etc.). If (X, Y, P) is a totally bounded game, then 
(*) for each subgame (A, B, Q) of (X9Y9P) the games (A*9B*9Q*) and 
(A*, B*9 - Q * ) are determined. 
However, (*) holds iff P satisfies the repeated limit condition (J. Kind ler [4, 5, 6] 
and N. J. Young [11]). Next, the repeated limit condition is equivalent to the 
following: 
/ x / y
P d | i d 5 = / y / x
p d S d i | 
for each pair of finitely additive probability measures § and r\ defined for all 
subsets of X and Y respectively (cf. [5] and [12]). The assumption of the total 
boundedness of (X, Y, P) is therefore too strong, even for getting (*); it 
incorporates, however, a reasonable condition ensuring the equality of repeated 
integrals of P with respect to countably additive probability measures on X and Y. 
On the other hand, so far there is no topological characterization of those functions 
P: X x Y—>R for whose the analogue of (*) holds with the mixed extensions 
constituted by the countably additive probability measures on X and Y. 
Remark 5. The above definitions and theorems can be extended to 
non-cooperative games (Xu ..., Xn9 Pu ..., Pn) of n players, where all P*: xx x ... x 
Xn—>R are bounded. To be more specific, let 
p[(xi9 * 0 = SUp |P,(*i, ..., Xn)-Pj(xu ..., Xt-u x'i9 xi + u ..., xn)\ 
where the supremum is taken over all (xu ..., JC,_I, xi+u ..., xn)9 and 
n 
pi(xi9x'i) = ^pi(xi9x'i). 
/ = -
Then p, is a pseudometric on X* and it is easy to check that for each k _i n 
\Pk(xu...9xH)-Pk(xu...9xH)\^ftpi(xi9x\). 
i = l 
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Thus each Pk is uniformly continuous with respect to the product pseudometric 
n 
p((xu ..., Xn), (X[, ..., Xn)) = ^Pi(Xi, X't). 
i = l 
Assuming that all (X,, p{) are totally bounded it is easy to show that also all (X,, p.) 
are totally bounded. Hence the completions (X,, p.) of (X,, p,) are compact and the 
extensions Pk of Pk are continuous on (Xi x ... x Xn, Xp.) • Let us note, moreover, 
that in the case of n =2, it is sufficient to assume that (Xi, pi) and (X2, p2) are 
totally bounded, since then (Xi, p?) and (X2, p2) are totally bounded by a theorem 
of A. Wald ([9], 2.1.3). For n IS 3, however, the assumption of the total bounded-
ness of all (Xt, p{) cannot be weakened in general, as the following example shows: 
X! = X2 = X3 = {1, 2, ..., n,...}, Pi(xu x2, x3) = sgn (x2-x3), and P2 = P3 = 0. 
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О ВПОЛНЕ ОГРАНИЧЕННЫХ ИГРАХ 
Кузгагс! Кге!ко>у$к1—Ка8П$1ау Те1§аг§ку 
Резюме 
В работе доказывается, что каждая стратегическая игра с ограниченной функцией выигрыша 
является плотной подигрой полной игры. Отсюда получается, что каждая вполне ограниченная 
игра является плотной подигрой компактно-непрерывной игры. 
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